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ERISA & UNCERTAINTY
BRENDAN S. MAHER*
PETER K. STRIS"

ABSTRACT
In the United States, retirement income and health insurance are
largely provided through private promises made incident to employment.
These "benefit promises" are governed by a statute called ERISA, which
many health care and pension scholars argue is the cause offundamental
problems with our nation's health and retirement policy. Inevitably,
however, they advance narrowly tailoredproposals to amend the statute.
This occurs because of the widely held view that reform should leave
undisturbed the underlying core of the statute. This Article develops a
theory of ERISA designed to illustrate the unavoidable needfor structural
reform.

* Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School;
A.B. Stanford University.
** Visiting Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School; Principal, Stris & Maher LLP; J.D.
Harvard Law School; B.A. University of Pennsylvania.
This Article was prompted and made possible by our litigation of three major ERISA cases before
the United States Supreme Court. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (argued by
Professor Stris on January 20, 2010), LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1020
(2008) (argued by Professor Stris on November 26, 2007), and Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc.,
547 U.S. 356 (2006) (argued by Professor Stris on March 28, 2006); see also Linda Greenhouse, Top
Court Allows Suit Over 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at Cl ("With 70 million people holding
about $3 trillion in 401(k) investments, the 9-to-0 decision [in LaRue] was one of the most important
rulings in years on the meaning of the federal pension law . . . ."). During this process, many have
generously shared their time. We are extremely grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss our
ideas with experts at the Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Labor, the Pension Rights Center, the American Health
Lawyers Association, the National Employment Lawyers Association, Public Citizen, and AARP. We
have benefited immensely from discussions about ERISA with many of our colleagues in the academy
including Professors Donald Bogan, Eric Chason, Jonathan Forman, David Pratt, Paul Secunda,
Andrew Stumpff, James A. Wooten, and Edward Zelinsky. We thank Professor Norman Stein in
particular for his extensive written comments on early drafts of this Article. And we are ever indebted
to Madelaine Behr for her invaluable research assistance. All errors are ours alone.
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INTRODUCTION

More than other developed nations, the United States relies on private
promises to assure health and retirement security.' These promises involve
"employee benefits." They are subsidized by the first- and third-largest tax
expenditures in the federal budget.2 And they are heavily regulated by a

1. See, e.g., Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller, Issues Still Facing Employer-Based
Pensions, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, & POSSIBILITIES 1, 1 (Teresa Ghilarducci &

Christian E. Weller eds., 2007) ("The U.S. stands apart from developed market economies in relying
heavily on individual employers to achieve the common goal of securing retirement income for
American workers.").
2. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (1991) ("[T]he system of tax subsidies to employer
pensions ... is the federal government's largest tax expenditure."). In recent years, the pension
subsidy referred to by Professor Weiss has been eclipsed by a related one. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL

YEAR 2009, at 298 tbl.19-3 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy09/pdf/
spec.pdf (noting that the largest tax expenditure in 2008 was the "exclusion of employer contributions
for medical insurance premiums and medical care," which cost the federal government more than $168
billion in revenue).
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landmark statute known as ERISA.3 In this Article, we develop a theory of
uncertainty designed to evaluate ERISA and its regulation of the benefit
promise.4
To set the stage, employee benefits come in varying forms. They
include traditional monthly pensions, 401(k) contributions, 6 and the
payment of health insurance premiums. As economists have long noted,
these benefits are wage substitutes.8 In other words, the promise of
benefits entails a corresponding reduction in salary. No one disputes,
therefore, that these promises should be secure, understood by both
parties, and not too costly to make or administer. But legal rules that
promote security and clarity may render benefit promises more costly; in
other words, rules may have both desirable and undesirable consequences,
and a given rule's ultimate desirability will virtually always require the
assessment and balancing of competing concerns regarding security,
clarity, and cost.
We argue that the most useful way to compare alternatives-both in
terms of prospective rule selection and retrospective rule evaluation-is to
frame the inquiry in terms of context-specific uncertainty. Economists
have long recognized the power of such framing in making difficult
choices between competing legal rules. 9 More recently, this mode of

3. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). ERISA regulates "employee pension
benefit plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). Today, such plans hold more than $5.2 trillion in
assets. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUND ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 77 (2009), available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z/20091210/z1.pdf ERISA also regulates "employee welfare
benefit plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). Today, a staggering percentage of health-care expenditures
are paid with insurance provided by such plans. See infra notes 85, 87 (describing the explosive, and
largely unanticipated, growth of employer-sponsored health insurance).
4. As one prominent health-care scholar recently noted, there is "an emerging body of work in
legal theory ... that examines how the framework of risk has developed into an explanatory model."
Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and DeliberativeDemocracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 n.3
(2008) (citing JENNY STEELE, RISKS AND LEGAL THEORY (2004); Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon,
EmbracingRisk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY

1 (2002); Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledge of Risks, in LAW AND RISK 86, 87 (2005)). For
ease of reference, the remainder of this paper will use the term "uncertainty" to refer to both risk and
uncertainty. See infra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text (defining risk and uncertainty, respectively).
5. See infra Part JI.A (discussing the "defined benefit" pension).
6. See infra Part JI.B (discussing the "defined contribution" pension).
7. See infra Part II.C (discussing employer-sponsored group health insurance). Our three-item
list is not exhaustive. Other significant benefits include, for example, severance and disability benefits,
but in this Article we have chosen to focus on pensions and health insurance.
8. See infra Part I (explaining the wage-substitute theory of benefits).
9. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
With Legal Standards,70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) ("analyz[ing] some ways in which uncertainty
about the application of legal standards can give parties economic incentives to 'overcomply' or to
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analysis has been employed by legal scholars to explain and evaluate
specific areas such as commercial contracts,10 property rights," and
criminal plea negotiations. 12 In our view, a similar approach is sorely
needed in the ERISA context, where existing scholarly and judicial
debates often suffer from a profoundly undertheorized conception of the
benefit promise and its regulation.
To be sure, there will always be disagreement regarding whether, and
how, government should provide, subsidize, or regulate pension and
health-care benefits.13 At the same time, thoughtful examination of
existing policy often reveals areas in which some intervention is
necessary.14 Broad thinking is essential
because, as ERISA scholars have
15
long observed, the stakes are high.

'undercomply"' with legal rules); F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on
Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 205 (1999) (examining "how judicial independence affects uncertainty about judicial
decisions" and "illustrat[ing] the link between the uncertainty surrounding court decisions and rates of
litigation through an adaptation of the well-known Priest and Klein model").
10. See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty,Ambiguity, and ContractualConditions, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 755 (2009) (arguing that uncertainty explains the use of material adverse events clauses
rather than price adjustments).
11. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2008) (exploring "[w]hat impact, if any," a property owner's
uncertainty about the scope of her rights should have on the remedies available to her against
encroaching users).
12. See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the CriminalProcess, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1995 (2006) (arguing that higher ambiguity aversion of defendants, as opposed to
prosecutors, results in unbalanced plea negotiations).
13. See, e.g., Alexander S. Preker et al., Private Participationin Supporting the Social Contact in
Health: New Insights from Institutional Economics, in RECENT HEALTH POLICY INNOVATIONS IN
SOCIAL SECURITY 209 (Aviva Ron & Xenia Scheil-Adlung eds., 2001); Lawrence H. Summers, Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (1989) (summarizing the
relative preferences of liberals and conservatives).
14. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, FederalizationSnowballs: The Need for NationalAction in
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844 (2009) (arguing that, because of federal
expenditures such as the tax subsidy for employer-sponsored health insurance, there is a need for
federal intervention in medical malpractice reform); Michele Varnhagen, U.S. FederalPensionPolicy:
Its Potentialand Pitfalls, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, & POSSIBILITIES 163, 181

(Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller eds., 2007) (noting, regrettably, that "[iln recent years when
Social Security has been under review ... , Social Security aficionados were loathe to add private
pension and savings issues to the debate").
15. See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974, A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) [hereinafter WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY]; John Bronsteen,

Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future ofHealth Care in the United
States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008); Colleen E. Medill, The IndividualResponsibility Model of
Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1 (2000); Norman
Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEW. PROBS. 71 (1993); Peter J. Wiedenbeck,
ERISA 's CuriousCoverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311 (1998).
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The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we argue that benefit
promises necessarily implicate three species of uncertainty(i) performance uncertainty (i.e., the likelihood that an agreed-upon benefit
promise will not be performed); (ii) expectation uncertainty (i.e., the
likelihood that a benefit promise does not reflect a mutual understanding
of promise terms); and (iii) collective uncertainty (i.e., the likelihood that a
proposed rule will undesirably reduce, overall, the number or generosity of
future benefit promises). In Part II, we briefly rehearse the most common
benefit arrangements regulated by ERISA. In Part III, we evaluate how the
different categories and aspects of ERISA benefit promises implicate
different mixes of uncertainty. In Part IV, we apply our model to several
important Supreme Court decisions, explaining, in part, why the Court has
written opinions that appear indefensible on purely doctrinal grounds. We
conclude by criticizing both the Court and Congress for failing to candidly
acknowledge that central questions inadvertently left open by ERISA
cannot be resolved without a comprehensive legislative response. 1 6
I. UNCERTAINTY

IN THE BENEFIT PROMISE

The phrase "employee fringe benefit" is commonly used to describe
any nonwage item of value provided by an employer to an employee. Yet
employer-provided health insurance, pensions, and other perquisites now
constitute a significant percentage of total compensation for working
Americans. Consequently, most scholars refer to these items only as
"employee benefits."
Before delivery, an employee benefit is simply a wage substitute
expressed as a promise of future consideration in whatever form the
benefit takes (e.g., a monthly pension check, employer-paid health
insurance premiums). In a well-known ERISA opinion written over twenty
years ago, Judge Richard A. Posner expressed the point with characteristic
elegance: "the less an employee's pension rights are worth, the higher are

16. Scholars have long expressed concern that the courts are ill equipped to resolve the various
policy questions ERISA left unsettled. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 15, at 110 (concluding that courts
are "poorly suited" to address ERISA's gaps and competing policies and that the "prescription for
ERISA reform ... is for Congress to reconsider particular benefits issues and furnish specific answers
to them"). Such is even more true today, as we explain.
17. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans," 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
559, 560 (1994) (explaining that "[e]mployer-provided benefits are now a major component of
compensation" and noting that "the cost of all employee benefits constituted 38.4% of payroll in
1990").
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the wages that he will demand." 18 Although the existence of this wagebenefit tradeoff is widely accepted by economists, 19 it was not recognized
by most American courts until the middle of the twentieth century.20
Any benefit promise will necessarily present "risks" (i.e., undesirable
outcomes that could materialize). 2 1 And any rational decision maker 2 2 Will
attempt to quantify such risks before selecting a particular course of
action.23 If a decision maker cannot quantify a material risk, she faces

18. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987). Judge
Posner was speaking of pension benefits, but his reasoning applies to all forms of benefits. And Judge
Posner was hardly the first to make this point. For a century, economists have characterized employee
benefits as wage substitutes. See, e.g., Albert deRoode, Pensions as Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 287,
287 (1913) ("A pension system ... is really paid by the employee, not perhaps in money, but in the
foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain except for the establishment of a pension
system."). This is not to say, of course, that the benefit-wage trade-off is dollar for dollar. Numerous
aggregate and individual market factors affect the particular benefit-wage trade-off that will be made
in given circumstances. Nor do we insist that in all circumstances individual employees necessarily
can or will perform an accurate wage-benefit trade-off calculation. The operative point we wish to
highlight is that benefits, even when imperfectly valued or bargained for, are not gratuities.
19. See, e.g., Nadia Karamcheva, Evaluating the Wage-Pension Trade-Off in a Dynamic Model
of Search and Savings 1 (Nov. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (citing Stephen A. Woodbury,
Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage Benefits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1983)), available at
http://fnwww.bc.edu/ec-j/semf2009/Kara.pdf (noting that "[s]tandard labor theory suggests that
workers self-select into jobs that offer a mix of wage and non-wage benefits that best matches their
preferences"); Karamcheva, supra,at 1 (citing Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of EqualizingDifferences,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR EcONOMICS 641 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986))
(observing that "the theory of equalizing differences implies that otherwise identical employees, who
receive higher non-wage benefits will be paid a lower wage").
20. See, e.g., Peter M. Rehon, The Pension Expectation as ConstitutionalProperty,8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 153, 168 (1980) ("[M]ost courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
viewed noncontributory private pension plans as mere gratuities . . . ."). See generally A. Norman
Somers & Louis Schwartz, Pension and Welfare Plans: Gratuitiesor Compensation?, 4 INDUs. &
LAB. REL. REV. 77 (1950); Comment, Considerationfor the Employer's Promise of a Voluntary
Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955); Note, Legal Status of PrivateIndustrial Pension Plans,
53 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1940).
21. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1028 n. 1 (1990) ("Technically speaking, 'risk' refers only to the probability of an event,
with something like 'gravity' designating its possible adverse consequences.").
22. There is, of course, an extensive behavioral psychology and behavioral economics literature
questioning the "rational actor" assumption. See Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF.
L. REV. 1651, 1651 (2009) (citing Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andBehavioralScience:
Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66
(2000)) ("Evidence gathered by psychologists and behavioral economists about human decision
making over the last three decades has raised a serious challenge to the rational actor assumption of
neoclassical economics."). Concerns about cognitive biases are particularly acute in complex areas like
retirement and health-care planning. See generally Gary Burtless, An Economic View ofRetirement, in
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 7 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999). We use the

rational actor assumption as a starting point, not an ending one, in our analysis.
23. For example, a rational employee will consider the likelihood that an employer will refuse to
pay the promised benefit before accepting a particular job offer. See, e.g., Karamcheva,supra note 19,
at 43-44 ("stud[ying] the trade-off that workers face when choosing between compensation in the
form of wages versus pension contributions" and proposing a model in which "[t]he decision of a
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what is often referred to by economists as "uncertainty." 2 4 As scholars
regularly observe, "[i]gnoring major problems because of uncertainty is an
invitation to disaster."2 5 In this Part, we present our theory of uncertainty.2 6
Part L.A addresses what we refer to as "performance uncertainty." Part I.B
addresses what we refer to as "expectation uncertainty." Part J.C addresses
what we refer to as "collective uncertainty." 27
A. Performance Uncertainty
Imagine the following promise made by Promisor A to Promisee B: "If
you today relinquish to me your seat on this crowded bus, exactly five
weeks from today I will pay you five hundred American dollars in cash."
The danger in relinquishing the seat is not that the promised benefit is
unclear and that one might be entitled to something less than five hundred
dollars; the danger is that the promise will not be performed. Among the
many reasons the promise may not be performed is that the promisor may
not have five hundred dollars available to give in five weeks' time. A
meeting of the minds does not ensure performance, and in the benefit
setting-where the beneficiaries are often elderly or ill when the promise
28
ripens-performance is paramount.

worker to accept or reject a job offer is the result of an interplay between his preferences and the set of
incentives and risks associated with the offered pension plan").
24. The distinction between risk and uncertainty was famously articulated in 1921 by noted
economist Frank Knight. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) (explaining

that uncertainty is unquantifiable risk); see also M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION,
UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY

ANALYSIS (1990). Our use ofthe term "uncertainty" encompasses both quantifiable and unquantifiable
risk.
25. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty 10 (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1555343.
All too often, the response to ... uncertainty is to ignore the problem in the hope that it will
go away .... Alternatively, advocates seize on their own version of the true magnitude of the
hazard, as if there were no doubt about the facts. Neither approach produces intelligent
analysis or sound policy.
Id. at 2.
26. As noted above, we use the term uncertainty to refer to both uncertainty and quantifiable risk.
For purposes of our conceptual model, the distinction will not matter. Of course, the distinction can
have great significance in a variety of settings, but such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
27. An employee frequently faces both performance and expectation uncertainty. Generally
speaking, an employer, because the employee's performance precedes benefit delivery, usually faces
only expectation uncertainty. And the government-i.e., lawmakers and judges-is regularly
confronted with collective uncertainty.
28.

See, e.g., RAY BOURHIS, INSULT TO INJURY: INSURANCE, FRAUD, AND THE BIG BUSINESS OF

BAD FAITH (2005) (explaining one trial lawyer's account of the devastating consequences of wrongful
benefit denials under ERISA).
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In the benefit context, performance uncertainty describes the likelihood
that the promisor will not perform in a way consistent with the shared
expectations of the parties at promise inception. That is, it describes the
possibility that the promisor will fail to deliver a benefit when there was, in
fact, an original meeting of the minds regarding its amount and triggering
conditions. The most obvious reason for such uncertainty is the possibility
that the promisor will lack the assets needed to confer the promised benefit
when the entitlement matures.29
Financial inability, however, is not the only threat to rightful benefit
conferral. Performance uncertainty also describes the possibility that
dishonesty, strategic play, or carelessness by the promisor or its agents will
result in a wrongful refusal to confer a benefit, even where the promisor has
sufficient assets and there was an original meeting of the minds regarding the
terms of the benefit promise. In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish
such an occurrence from what we call "expectation uncertainty." 30 This
difficulty can pose challenging problems for policy makers and nearinsurmountable problems for the judiciary.31

29. ERISA's drafters were acutely conscious of this possibility. Few dispute that the statute was
passed, in part, as a response to several high-profile pension defaults that arose from company failures
that devastated the pensions of many workers. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story
ofFailure in the Business ": The Studebaker-PackardCorporationand the Origins ofERISA, 49 BUFF.
L. REv. 683, 683-84 (2001) ("When Studebaker-Packard closed the facility in December 1963 the
pension plan for hourly workers did not have enough assets to meet its obligations.... [Tlhe plan
defaulted on its obligations to younger employees. Some received a lump-sum payment worth a
fraction of the pension they expected, and others got nothing at all.").
30. See infra Part I.B (discussing expectation uncertainty). This difficulty, however, does not
prevent one from making reasonable assumptions. For example, those who make ERISA benefit
decisions are often controlled directly or indirectly by the benefit-payor. See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra
note 15, at 2306. As such, conflicted decision making is common in many ERISA settings where "the
promisor keeps one less dollar for every dollar paid in benefits." Id. at 2308; see also id. at 2308 n.36.
Consider the incentives facing pension administrators for a traditional (i.e., "defined benefit") pension
plan. See infra Part JI.A (describing the mechanics of a defined benefit pension plan). To the extent
that interpreting an ambiguous promise would reduce the outstanding defined pension obligation by X
dollars, that is X fewer dollars the company would need to contribute at the next finding interval or
make up in the event of funding shortfall. Whether the administrators are employees of the employerpromisor or outside independent contractors, there is likely significant performance uncertainty. See,
e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 15, at 2309. Of course, employers and their agents face reputational costs
associated with wrongful benefit denials. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault
on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625,
642 (2001) ("[T]he notion that ERISA-covered plans can deny benefits willy-nilly without significant
[reputational] penalty is plainly exaggerated."). That said, benefit decisions involving complex issues
or significant discretion may have modest reputational consequences because few, if any, will
appreciate or even believe the "wrongness" of the denial. See, e.g., Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies,
Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathedral,26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387,
398 n.56 (2009) (arguing that "the extent to which market forces affect the behavior of ... plan
fiduciaries is an empirical question ... [and] there is much evidence to suggest that market forces are
woefully insufficient").
31. See infra Part I.C (discussing collective uncertainty).

2010]

ERISA & UNCERTAINTY

441

B. Expectation Uncertainty
Expectation uncertainty describes the likelihood that, at promise
inception, the parties do not share a material expectation regarding the
32
meaning (usually, the appliedmeaning) of the promise. The absence of a
shared expectation can occur because (i) the parties have firm but differing
initial expectations regarding the meaning of the promise in a particular
circumstance (a "circumstance-specific expectation"), (ii) one party has an
initial circumstance-specific expectation and the other party does not, or
(iii) neither party has a circumstance-specific expectation.
Although the last two variants describe a total or partial absence of a
specific expectation, they are nonetheless instances of expectation
uncertainty because, in virtually all cases, a broad standard of conduct
encompassed by the promise (or imposed by law) supplies a general
expectation of promise content (e.g., the promisor would follow
"fiduciary" standards of conduct in performing the promise). Missing,
however, is an expectation regarding the application of that standard in a
particularcircumstance (e.g., that a fiduciary in situation A would do X

and not Y).33
Indeed, a useful generalization regarding expectation uncertainty tracks
the time honored rule-standard continuum. 34 If a one-sentence description
of law is that it attaches consequences to conduct or circumstance (i.e., if
Conduct A occurs, Consequence B follows), then, to oversimplify, classic
"rules" are legal directives that, in objectively discernible circumstances,
impose determinate results. 35 Classic "standards" are legal directives that,
32. Expectation uncertainty varies significantly with the content and form of the promise. See
infra Part III.
33. We explore this particular example in considerably more detail infra Part III.B-C (discussing
uncertainties associated with, in particular, 401(k) plan management).
34. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961); RICHARD A. POSNER,

THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L.
REv. 14, 22-39 (1967); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different
Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REv. 475, 482-87 (1933); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379,
400-18 (1985). Broadly speaking, rules offer the virtue of predictability but the vice of rigidity;
standards offer the vice of uncertainty but the virtue of situational fairness. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra, at
561-62 ("One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving the extent to which a
given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement authority to
consider.").
35. "Rule," obviously, has two meanings. One is a broad meaning, where "legal rule" is
essentially a synonym for any "law" or "legal directive." Using that meaning, a "classic rule" and a
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in circumstances possessing a certain character, authorize a range of
consequences sensitive to situational facts. 36 Generally, a benefit promise
that is contractually or statutorily "rule-based" will contain less
expectation uncertainty than a "standard-based" promise. The more
objective and discretely conditioned the promise, the more modest the
expectation uncertainty. 7 Conversely, the more discretionary and
ambiguously conditioned the promise, the higher the expectation
-38
uncertainty.
Another useful generalization is that expectation uncertainty varies
with promise complexity.3 9 Complexity increases the likelihood that a
promisee will either form incorrect circumstance-specific expectations
(e.g., she may not appreciate that a specific provision of the promise
directly speaks to the circumstance), or she may rely, for large portions of
the promise, on a thematic standard-based expectation (e.g., "the fiduciary
must do what is in my best interest").

"classic standard" are both subsets of the universe of rules. The narrow meaning of "rule" is "rule as
opposed to a standard." See supra note 34. Because referring to the narrow meaning of rule as "classic
rule" is cumbersome, throughout this Article we use the term "rule" in both the broad and narrow
ways, with the relevant meaning supplied by context.
36. Of course, a directive may have both qualities.
For example, a rule may determine which of two standards applies, or vice versa (as when
two rules arguably govern and some principle must be invoked to choose between the rules).
Even focusing on a single step in reaching a legal conclusion, a particular law will have
qualities of rules and of standards, with competing formulations differing in the degree to
which they are rule- or standard-like.
Kaplow, supra note 34, at 561 n.6. Moreover, application of a standard to a common fact pattern can
result in a de facto rule, where all similar fact patterns are treated formalistically. See, e.g., RIcHARD
A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.1, at 583 (7th ed. 2007) ("[A]n accumulation of
precedents dealing with the same question may create a rule of law having the same force as an
explicit statutory rule."); see also Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1989) (discussing precedents as rules). Imprecision, however, does not diminish the heuristic value of
the rules-standards generalization.
37. For example, a simple pension promise of a fixed monthly payment, payable at age 65 and
based exclusively on years worked, with no offset or adjustments for salary, poses relatively little
expectation uncertainty. Cf Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA 's FundamentalContradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (1988) ("[A]t the margin there can be doubt
about how particular [defined benefit pension] plan terms apply to particular circumstances.")
(emphasis added).
38. Health insurance, using "medical necessity" as the coverage fulcrum, is a well-known,

perhaps notorious, example. See infra Part III.C.
39. By complexity, we speak expansively. We refer to the number of operative parts of the
promise (e.g., a pension promise with two conditions is easier to understand than one with twenty). We
also refer to the extent to which nonexperts can understand a material element of the promise in a
circumstance-specific way.
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C. Collective Uncertainty
Broadly speaking, performance and expectation uncertainty impair the
smooth functioning of the labor market.4 0 In many cases, the result of such
impairment is financially41 or physically devastating. 42 Therefore,
government intervention is often proposed. Experts have long recognized,
however, that such measures are not free of consequences. 43 Put simply,
ensuring performance and protecting promisee expectations may increase
substantially the cost to the promisor.44 That, in turn, could result in fewer

40. As noted above, benefits are compensation-not gifts. See supra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text. A hypothetically rational employer (or employee) cannot offer (or accept) a
compensation package without first understanding the expected value of both the promised benefits
and the foregone wages. Performance and expectation uncertainty make it considerably more difficult
to make the correct wage-benefit trade-off. An expectation risk example: an employee who voluntarily
foregoes wages in exchange for health insurance would-all else being equal-have traded more
wages than is rational if she believed the promised health insurance benefits were considerably more
generous than an average impartial arbiter would have concluded. A performance risk example: an
employee who voluntarily foregoes wages in exchange for a traditional pension would-all else being
equal-have traded more wages than is rational if she understood the nominal value of the promised
pension but failed entirely to consider a meaningful likelihood that the company will go bankrupt and
have insufficient assets to pay its pensioners. Of course, even when players are not perfectly rational,
performance and expectation uncertainty would still impair bargaining.
41. See, e.g., Phelps v. C.T. Enters., Inc., 394 F.3d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 2005) (allegedly wrongful
termination of health plan funding left employees with $286,000 in unpaid claims); Drennan v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1992) (GM allegedly told laid-off employees that they were
not eligible for a particular plan in order to induce them to choose a substantially less generous plan).
42. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1998) (death
allegedly caused by delayed authorization for bone marrow transplant); Cannon v. Grp. Health Serv. of
Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1271 (10th Cir. 1996) (death allegedly caused by delayed authorization for
treatment); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1995) (suicide allegedly resulting
from refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits under the plan); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d
129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993) (death allegedly caused by withdrawn authorization for surgery); Kuhl v.
Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993) (death allegedly resulting from
delayed authorization for surgery); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir.
1992) (death of unborn child allegedly caused by denial of authorization for hospitalization); Turner v.
Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 421 (D. Mass. 1997), affd, 127 F.3d 196, 197 (1st Cir.
1997) (death allegedly resulting from the denial of a bone marrow transplant).
43. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme CourtFlunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 207, 228
[hereinafter Langbein, Supreme Court Flunks Trusts] ("[T]he price of [stronger protective legal rules]
will be lowered levels of plan formation and less generous funding."); Stein, supra note 15, at 73
("[Tlhe overarching policy decision to furnish retirement and health benefits through the private
employment market rests uneasily on competing notions: government regulation is necessary to ensure
that private law adequately delivers benefits, but too much regulation diminishes the willingness of
employers to sponsor plans at all.").
44. See, e.g., Carole Roan Gresenz et al., A Flood ofLitigation? Predictingthe Consequences of
Changing Legal Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries, RAND HEALTH LAW 2 tbl.1 (1999),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP184.pdf (column entitled "opponents of
changing remedies").
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employers making promises45 or employers making less generous
46
promises.
ERISA is commonly read to reflect a legislative desire for more (and
more generous) plans. Not only does such sentiment appear, in the view of
some, in the legislative history, but it also sounds in favor of the tax
subsidy.4 7 ERISA's drafters, one could argue, made the proper normative
judgment (i.e., that it is socially desirable to encourage additional
retirement savings and greater welfare-such as health-insurance
coverage).
Accordingly,
some
observers presumptively view
governmental measures that could diminish the overall frequency or
generosity of benefits to constitute a decrease in the welfare of promisees
as a group-and perhaps the nation as a whole.
"Collective uncertainty" is our term for the possibility that, for an
imagined rule affecting the benefit promise, the costs associated with
compliance and enforcement will be such that the rule on balance may or
will actually decrease overall welfare. 4 8 To the extent that they are made
explicit, concerns about collective uncertainty are often formulated as
follows: if Judicial Rule A or Regulation B or Statutory Amendment C is
put in place, the undesirable consequence will be fewer or less generous
plans. That is, collective uncertainty admits of the possibility that making
benefit promises more secure will not be "worth" it because it may lead to

45. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of the Settlor
Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAW. 205, 213 (1999) ("An inherent tension exists in ERISA between, on the one
hand, protecting the benefit expectations of plan participants and, on the other hand, limiting the costs
imposed upon benefit plan sponsors so as not to overly discourage voluntary plan sponsorship.").
46. Cf SHARON TENNYSON & WILLIAM J. WARFEL, NAT'L ASS'N MUT. INS. COS., FIRST-PARTY
INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIABILITY: LAW, THEORY, AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 14 (2008),
available at http://www.namic.org/publicpolicy/080926BadFaith.pdf (arguing that the careless
expansion of liability "will [result in] unwarranted increases in claim costs that are ultimately
distributed to the insuring public in the form of higher insurance premiums").
47. See infra Part II.A (discussing subsidy). A keen observer might argue that the legislative
history can more accurately be portrayed as expressing congressional concern only that there not be
appreciably fewer or less generous plans, as opposed to a desire to affirmatively encourage plan
formation or more generous benefits. The merits of this distinction aside, the Supreme Court does not
appear to accept it. See, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648-49 (2010) (quoting Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)) ("We have therefore recognized that ERISA
represents a 'careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan
and the encouragement of the creation of such plans."').
48. Any government action presents the possibility of decreasing overall social welfare. See, e.g.,
Gillette & Krier, supra note 21, at 1028 ("[T]hough risk by definition is costly, avoiding risk is costly
as well."). Some regulatory costs are direct (e.g., the salaries of government employees). Others result
from incentives created by the government intervention. See, e.g., Stris, supra note 30, at 396-99
(discussing, at some length, typical incentive arguments made by each side of the debate over the
proper liability rules for wrongful denial of ERISA benefits); see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 21,
at 1028 (noting that "the objective of risk management must be ... the minimization of all risk-related
costs").
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a possible reduction in collective welfare. In other words, a few broken
promises or defeated expectations may be acceptable if the result is more
plans and more generous benefit promises overall.49
A decrease in collective welfare associated with benefit promise rule
choice is not abstract fantasy. Consider the following hypothetical
proposal: Congress, to increase the deterrent power of ERISA remedies,
amends the statute to require that all wrongful health-care benefit denials
result in the imposition of punitive damages equal to five times the value
of the denied benefit. There is little doubt that such an amendment would
cause many employers to cease offering health insurance as an employee
benefit. Given the lack of reasonable individual (nongroup) health
insurance options in America,so such a result would be undesirable in the
eyes of many observers.
II. THE ERISA BENEFIT PROMISE
In this Part, we rehearse the most common benefit promises that are
regulated by ERISA. Part II.A explores the traditional pension promise.
Part II.B evaluates the now-dominant pension promise of which the 401(k)
is the most common example. Part II.C briefly addresses typical welfare
benefit promises (e.g., health, disability, and life insurance).
A. The DefinedBenefit PensionPromise
ERISA governs two kinds of employee benefit plans: 52 One-a pension
plan-is defined by the statute as "any plan, fund, or program ...
established or maintained by an employer" that "provides retirement

49. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creatinga PaternalisticMarket for Legal Rules Affecting the
Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 657, 665-69 (discussing possible consequences of more protective
rules). As we discuss later, certain promise types (and subsets of promise types), as well as attendant
legal rules, can be more "volatile" and uncertain than others. This may deter risk-averse employers
from making the promise in the first place or result in risk-averse employers promising less. See infra
Part II.A and accompanying notes.
50. See generally Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, PatientsAs Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MIcH. L. REv. 643 (2008); Mark A. Hall, Of Magic Wands
and Kaleidoscopes: FixingProblems in the IndividualMarket, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 23, 2002, available
at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.353v1.
51. Recent health-care reform-depending on the degree to which it survives the parade of legal
challenges-may, of course, make desirable and affordable individual health insurance more readily
available. We merely use a hypothetical health-care legal rule to illustrate the concept of collective
uncertainty in a given benefit regime.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006) ("The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.").
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income" or "results in a deferral of income by employees ....

3 The

statute expressly divides all pension plans into two further categories:
"defined benefit" and "defined contribution."5 4
A defined benefit plan is intended "to provide systematically for the
payment of definitely determinable benefits to ... employees over a
period of years, usually for life, after retirement."5 5 The amount of the
benefit is calculated pursuant to a formula that customarily takes into
56
account the participant's years of service and compensation. When
ERISA was enacted in 1974, the vast majority of retirement plan
participants were covered by a defined benefit plan.
No employer is required to sponsor a defined benefit (or any other)
pension plan. In order to encourage sponsorship, however, the federal
government has long awarded preferential tax treatment to such plans.
Broadly speaking, the mechanics of this preference can be summarized as
follows: "employer contributions to the plans are deductible expenses ...
at the time the contributions are made . . . and neither the contributions nor
the investment earnings . . . are taxable until benefits are actually paid to

the plan participants."59
The basic thinking is as follows: many employees will likely be
indifferent (at best) as between $X in current salary and a guaranteed
future income stream whose net present value is $X.If the latter is subject
to more favorable tax treatment, however, a greater number of employees
may choose to forego pretax wages in exchange for it. Accordingly, the
government has elected to afford more favorable tax treatment to pensions
in order to encourage employees to defer compensation so that they will
have a steady stream of income once they reach the age of retirement. This

53. 29 U.S.C.
54. 29 U.S.C.
55. 26 C.F.R.

§ 1002(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
§ 1002(34) (defined contribution); § 1002(35)
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2004).

(defined benefit).

56. See DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 201-12 (7th ed. 1996);

see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans, 1999 LAW REV. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C. L. 187, 187 (citing Ann C. Foster,
Public and Private Sector Defined Benefit Pensions: A Comparison, 2 COMPENSATION & WORKING
CONDITIONS 37 (1997)) ("For example, a [defined benefit pension] plan might provide that a worker's
annual retirement benefit is equal to 2% times years of service times final average compensation (B
2%xyosxfac).").
57. WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supranote 15, at 278 ("As late as 1979, more than 80 percent of
individuals who participated in a private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit plan."); Fishel &
Langbein, supra note 37, at 1112. There were employees covered by what today we would call defined
contribution plans, but the assets in those plans were vastly smaller than the assets backing the defined
benefit plans.
58. See PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES, at vii (William G. Gale, John B. Shoven, &

Mark J. Warshawsky eds., 2004) ("Tax incentives for employer-based pensions originated in 1921.").
59. MCGILL, supra note 56, at 136; see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 402-404 (2006).
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was a major social policy decision.60 It results in the loss of almost fifty
billion dollars in tax revenue each year. 61 And it is an enduring
justification for the extensive restrictions that are placed on private-sector
*62
pension plans.
It is worth noting that defined benefit plans were used prior to the level
of tax preference that exists today. 63 This illustrates that there are nontax
reasons to sponsor such plans. For example, a defined benefit plan can be
used to create incentives that influence significantly the timing of
employees' retirement decisions, 64 to create incentives that discourage
quitting by employees in whom the employer has made a substantial
investment, 65 and to improve job performance by giving employees a
direct financial stake in the viability of the firm. 6 6

60. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2002) ("The passage of [ERISA] marked the federal government's recognition
that promoting retirement security through employer-sponsored pension plans was an important
national goal.").
61. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 298 tbl.19-3 (noting that the tax
expenditure for "employer plans" was more than $45 billion in 2009). The foregone revenues
associated with other employer-sponsored pensions (e.g., 401(k) and Keogh plans) are listed
separately. See id.
62. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006) (listing various requirements that a plan must satisfy in
order to "qualify" for preferential tax treatment).
63. "By 1933, private [defined benefit] pensions covered roughly one in six workers in the
economy." RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE,
ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 3 (1997) [hereinafter IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE].

64. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Yung-Ping Chen, Optimal Retirement Age, in 2 NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION

§ 14.03(2)

(2008) (noting

that a defined benefit plan will customarily "impose large financial penalties on workers who stay past
the plan's normal retirement age" and "often offer early retirement incentives"); see also IPPOLITO,
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 12 ("Virtually all firms penalize late retirement through
the [defined benefit] pension plan" by "refraining from awarding offsetting increases in annuities to
workers who choose to retire beyond the normal retirement age."); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the
Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 31 J.L. & Econ. 85, 87 (1988)
[hereinafter Ippolito, ERISA Study] (asserting that defined benefit plans "permit the firm to penalize
workers who . . . retire 'too late"'); Andrew A. Samwick, New Evidence on Pensions, Social Security,
and the Timing of Retirement, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 207 (1998); James H. Stock & David A. Wise,
Pensions, the Option Value of Work, and Retirement, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1151 (1990). See generally
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans, in ISSUES IN
PENSION ECONOMICS 283 (1987).

65. See, e.g., Forman & Chen, supra note 64, § 14.03(2) (noting that a defined benefit plan will
typically "provide large financial incentives for workers to stay with a firm at least until they are
eligible for early retirement"); see also IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 3
(noting "the traditional view that [defined benefit] pensions help employers reduce quit rates at early
ages"); id. at 17 (arguing that "[dleparture from the firm . . . 'too early' . . . breaks the contract and
triggers pensions penalties"); id. at 18-29 (evaluating the impact of defined benefit pensions on quit
rates); ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDuN, COMING UP SHORT, THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K)
PLANS 2 (2004) ("Since pension benefits based on final earnings increase rapidly as job tenures
lengthen, these plans motivate workers to remain with the firm."); Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note
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B. The Defined ContributionPensionPromise
Unlike a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan does not
promise a specific amount of benefits at retirement. Instead, an employee
who participates in a defined contribution plan is assigned an individual
account within the plan to which money is contributed by the employee,
her employer, or both. 67 The employee is a beneficial owner of the funds
allocated to her individual account.68 At any point in time, her account
balance is equal to the total amount of past contributions, adjusted to
reflect the account's share of any income or expenses, any gains or losses,
and any forfeitures of other participants' accounts.69 Upon retirement, the
employee's benefit is simply the balance of her account. 70 In essence, a
defined contribution pension plan is a "tax-preferred savings account[] .
As noted above, in terms of assets and number of participants, defined
benefit plans were the dominant variety of retirement arrangements when
ERISA was enacted in 1974.72 The pension landscape, however, has
dramatically changed since that time.73 In fact, scholars generally agree
that the most important development in private pensions over the past two
decades is the massive shift away from defined benefit to defined

64, at 87 (asserting that defined benefit plans "permit the firm to penalize workers who ... quit the
firm 'too early').
66. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 4 (noting the settled view that

"defined benefit plans ... dissuade workers from shirking or engaging in malfeasance on the job");
Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (noting that defined benefit plans "expose the work force
as a whole to losses in the event of firm failure, thereby giving workers a stake in the long-term
viability of the firm"). Employees with certain preferences are willing to accept such a deal (i.e., to
join an employer with a defined benefit plan thereby foregoing wages) because such employment
"provid[es] an opportunity ... to spread investment risks over a large number of cohorts," Ippolito,
ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 88, by "tak[ing] advantage of the long horizon of firms relative to
workers ..... Id. at 87-88.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006).
68. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006).
70. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 56, at 188 n.3 ("[C]ontributions might be set at 10% of annual
compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30,000 in a given year would have $3,000
contributed to an individual investment account for her. Her benefit at retirement would be based on
all such contributions plus investment earnings thereon.").
71. Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (also explaining that, in such a plan, "[tihe firm
deposits a portion of wages into each worker's account each year and, after short vesting periods . . .,
the account belongs to the workers").
72. Even as recently as 1988, "[ajpproximately four out of five pension participants [we]re
covered primarily by defined benefit pension plans." Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87
(emphasis omitted).
73. Forman, supra note 56, at 189 ("In the private sector, the shift away from defined benefit
plans has been going on for years.").
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contribution plans.7 4 In the United States, this is largely attributable to the
explosive growth of the 401(k) plan-named after a provision in the
Internal Revenue Code that did not exist when ERISA was signed into
law. 75
Several theories have been advanced to explain this shift to defined
contribution plans. Some focus on changes in federal regulatory policy
that increased the relative cost of administering defined benefit plans.76
Others focus on what they argue is disproportionately favorable tax
treatment of the 401(k). Still others maintain that something more
fundamental occurred-a change in the way Americans think about
savings. 7 8 Regardless of the reason, this shift has led to much debate about
what, if any, changes in government policy should be implemented in
response.7 9
C. The Welfare Benefit Promise
As previously noted, ERISA was not limited to the regulation of
pension plans; it also governs what the statute refers to as "welfare"
plans.80 A welfare plan is defined as "any plan, fund, or program . . .

74. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 4 ("The most important development
in private pensions in the past fifteen years is the gradual shift away from defined benefit plans and
toward defined contribution plans.").
75. See, e.g., WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supranote 15, at 279. To be sure, however, "there has
been a worldwide trend towards defined contribution plans that seems to be affecting both private
pensions and national social security programs." Forman, supra note 56, at 189-90 (footnote omitted)
(citing WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND
PROMOTE GROWTH (1994); Kevin Dent & David Sloss, The Global Outlookfor Defined Contribution
Versus Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 12 BENEFITS Q. 23 (1996); Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose
Pension Is It Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a PrivatizedSocial Security System, 76 N.C. L.
REv. 1653, 1660-64 (1998)).
76. See MCGILL, supra note 56, at 40 ("While the possible explanations for the decline in
defined benefit plans and the shift toward defined contribution plans are numerous, at least part of the
reason is the increasing expense of administering defined benefit plans.").
77. IPPOLITO, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, supra note 63, at 7 ("Congress enacted legislation that
increased the relative costs of defined benefit plans, in terms of both higher regulatory burden and
smaller tax advantages.").
78. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm,114 YALE L.J. 451
(2004).
79. "[T]here is a good deal of debate about how and whether government policies should be
changed to stem the 'erosion' in traditional defined benefit plans." Forman, supra note 56, at 190
(citing ADVISORY COUNCIL OF EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFITS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT
ON THE WORKING GROUP ON THE MERITS OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION VS. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
WITH AN EMPHASIS ON SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS (1997); Sue Burzawa, Defined Benefit vs.

Defined Contribution Plans-CurrentState of the Debate and Future Influences, 51 EMP. BENEFIT
PLAN REv. 10 (1997); Christopher Conte, Retirement Prospects in a Defined Contribution World: A
Report on EBRI's April 30, 1997, Policy Forum, 18 EBRI NOTES 1 (1997)).
80. See supra note 3.
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established or maintained by an employer" that "provid[es] ... medical,
surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment ...

"81 Today, many welfare

plan benefits take the form of insurance (whether through self-insurance or
82
a third-party policy the employer purchases). Pursuant to such an
arrangement, an employee gives up some amount of current wages in
exchange for a promise of a contractually defined benefit payment if and
when a contingent event should occur.83
As of 2002, ERISA-govemed welfare plans covered 137 million
workers, retirees, and their families. 84 These plans have an extraordinary
influence on the delivery of health-care85 and other nonretirement benefits
such as severance pay, life insurance, and disability insurance.86 This
astonishing growth in welfare benefits-most notably employer-sponsored
health insurance-was almost certainly not anticipated by those who
drafted the statute.

81. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
82. See infra note 85.
83.

There are several perils that are often covered by employer-sponsored insurance: illness

(health insurance), debilitating injuries (disability insurance), death (life insurance), and income
disruption (severance pay).
84. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Qualchoice's Petition for
En Banc Rehearing at 13, Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-3614).
85. The majority of private health insurance in the United States is provided through ERISAgoverned welfare plans. See Sara R. Collins, Chapin White & Jennifer L. Kriss, Whither EmployerBased Health Insurance? The Current and Future Role of US. Companies in the Provision and
Financing of Health Insurance, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Sept. 2007, at 7 fig. 1, available at
http://www. commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2007/Sep/Whither-EmployerBased-Health-Insurance--The-Current-and-Future-Role-of-U-S--Companies-in-the-Provis.aspx (noting
that, in 2006, 62% of nonelderly Americans received private health insurance from an employer); see
also GARY OLIN, MEDICAL EXPENDITURES OF THE NON-ELDERLY BY AGE AND INSURANCE STATUS,

2004, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data files/publications/stl97/
statl97.pdf (noting that 79% of all medical expenditures were made by those with private health
insurance in 2004).
86. For example, "[s]hort- and long-term disability benefits were available [in 2004] to 39 and 30
percent of workers, respectively, and nearly all participated." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SuRvEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY

IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/
ebsm0002.pdf.
87. See, e.g., WOOTEN, ERISA HISTORY, supra note 15, at 281 ("In the political history of
pension reform, there was little discussion of employer-sponsored health plans."); Catherine L. Fisk,
Lochner Redux: The Renaissance ofLaissez-Faire Contract in the FederalCommon Law of Employee
Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 165 (1995) (ERISA's drafters gave "relatively little thought to the
problem of health benefits . . . ."); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheersfor Employment-Based
Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) ("Health benefits were
included in ERISA as an afterthought, with little consideration given to whether the same regulatory
framework would work. . . .").
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III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE ERISA BENEFIT PROMISE

ERISA's passage was premised on a simple trade-off. Congress wished
to make benefit promises more secure, but not so costly as to result in
appreciably fewer or less generous benefit promises being made overall.
Legal rules can significantly affect both promise security and cost.
Consequently, the question of what rules to impose is one of central
importance. As explained in Part I, the answer must turn on the
performance, expectation, and collective uncertainties that attend the
benefit promise at issue. 8 In this Part, we evaluate the nuanced ways in
which these uncertainties differ both across and within the primary benefit
arrangements governed by ERISA.
A. Defined Benefit PensionPromise Uncertainty
The overwhelming focus of ERISA was the defined benefit pension
plan.89 Unsurprisingly, therefore, examination of the statute reveals that
Congress gave thoughtful consideration to the promise-security versus
promise-cost trade-off in selecting legal rules to govern this category of
employee benefits.
Performance Uncertainty.A major threat to the traditional pension was
one specific manifestation of performance uncertainty-promises broken
for lack of funds. 90 ERISA included potent safeguards to minimize this
type of uncertainty. Congress established mandatory funding rules, 91
required that plan assets be held in trust, 92 imposed specific obligations
and prohibitions on those who administered the trust,93 and collected
premium payments from plan sponsors to fund a government-run pension
insurance program.94 Although one could argue that these safeguards are

88. For example, promises-or identifiable aspects of promises-that pose massive performance
uncertainty but little collective uncertainty likely deserve different legal rules than promises with a
converse balance of uncertainty. The simple reason is that rules that potently address uncertainty of a
certain type and magnitude may do little to address (and often worsen) uncertainty of a different type
and size. The uncertainty to be tamed drives rule selection.
89. Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 ("Defined benefit pension plans are the primary
focus of ERISA. . . .").
90. See supra note 29.
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2006).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006) ("[AIll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust
by one or more trustees" who, subject to limited exceptions, "shall have exclusive authority and
discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan . . . .").
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). According to ERISA, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) was created:
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too "costly,"9 5 observers seem to agree that ERISA has been successful in
this area.96
Expectation Uncertainty. The obvious (though often ignored) point of
any defined employee benefit is to define the benefit (i.e., to limit by
contract and statutory command the likelihood that the parties will have
differing understandings regarding the content of the promise). This,
indeed, is the appeal of a defined benefit; all parties involved know its
value. As such, they are better able to bargain over wages and benefits,
and to plan accordingly for retirement. A central aim of a defined benefit
arrangement, then, is to reduce expectation uncertainty. 97 Of course,
successful mitigation of such uncertainty will also lessen performance
uncertainty because clearer promises are more difficult to break with
impunity (i.e., there are reputational consequences and a greater likelihood
of ex post legal sanction).98
In order to improve the definition of all employee benefits, ERISA
imposed several general requirements. It required that plans be in writing 99
and "specify the basis on which payments are made . . . from the plan."100

For similar reasons, it imposed disclosure and reporting requirements. 101

(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the
benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of
pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under plans to which this subchapter
applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 1306 of
this title at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this subchapter.
Id.
95. The argument would be that strict funding requirements-and the cost of regulatory
compliance-discourage the offering of pensions, including some pensions that would have in fact
been performed (i.e., the reduced performance uncertainty of strict funding requirements is outweighed
by increased collective uncertainty).
96. This is not to say there are not grounds for criticism regarding the PBGC insurance program.
Appropriate premium levels and funding rules have been and are subject to considerable debate. See,
e.g, Daniel B. Klaff, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: Reforming the Defined Benefit Pension
System, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553, 559-60 (2007) (mentioning recent legislative debate over funding
and premiums).
97. Certainly defined benefits also transfer retirement income risk from the promisee to the
promisor, although that self-evidently depends on the financial robustness of the promisor and the
scope of any government guarantee. In contrast, far too infrequently acknowledged is the real work
that defining the benefit accomplishes. Clarity supplies utility whether the promise is soundly or
weakly backed.
98. Cf infra note 108.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4); see also MCGILL, supra note 56, at 46 ("This requirement's
fundamental purpose is to ensure that the plan is a formal arrangement, communicated as such to all
employees affected, and that it is distinguishable from the informal and unenforceable arrangements
that characterized the early years of the private pension movement in this country.").
101. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006) (requiring a summary plan description "written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant"); S. REP. No. 93-127, at 11 (1973)

2010]

ERISA & UNCERTAINTY

453

With regard to defined benefit pension plans, ERISA went even further. It
imposed certain mandatory contract terms regarding vesting. 10 2 It also
included specific requirements regarding the form of written promises. 103
The corresponding reduction in expectation uncertainty is self-evident. We
consider next the more difficult question: to what extent does enforcement
of such rules heighten collective uncertainty?
Collective Uncertainty. In regulating the traditional pension promise,
Congress was careful to avoid broadly mandating specific promise content
(i.e., a pension benefit must be at least 1 of an employee's highest
annual salary). Congress also made numerous decisions in drafting ERISA
that were designed to minimize the costs of regulatory compliance. 104
Congress was evidently concerned about the collective uncertainty that
might arise from rules which could substantially increase promise cost.
Concerns about the chilling effects of high promise cost did not,
however, lead Congress to abandon traditional civil enforcement rules. 105
This is not surprising because there is little reason to believe that judicial
application of traditional liability rules would imperil the frequency or
generosity of defined benefit pension promises any more than default
contract rules in general limit deal content and frequency. 10 6 To be fair,
defined benefit promises have grown considerably more complicated in
the years following ERISA's enactment. But increased complexity does

("Subcommittee findings were abundant in establishing that an average plan participant, even where
he has been furnished an explanation of his plan provisions, often cannot comprehend them because of
the technicalities and complexities of the language used."); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (2006)
(providing remedies for violations of disclosure and reporting requirements).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2006). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2085, amended ERISA and shortened the vesting periods. See also Langbein, supra note 43, at 227
(footnote omitted) ("ERISA abridges freedom of contract in some respects, but not others. For
example, ERISA's vesting rules greatly restrict the parties' freedom to agree upon forfeiture of
accrued pension benefits, yet ERISA's vesting rules do not apply to nonpension benefits such as health
care.").
103. Defined benefit pension plans are required to provide benefits that are computed via a fixed
formula and not within the discretion of the promisor. See Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130
(confirming that benefits are definitely determinable when computed via a fixed formula and "not
within the discretion of the employer"); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009) (requiring that a plan
provide "definitely determinable benefits"); see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(25) (2006) (pertaining to
"actuarial assumptions").
104. One such example was the inclusion of broad preemption provisions. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (2006). Preemption, among other things, shields promisors that conduct multistate business
from having to comply with the regulatory requirements of several jurisdictions, which can pose
significant cost.
105. Congress specifically authorized a private right of action permitting a participant or
beneficiary in any ERISA plan to bring suit to, inter alia, "enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also infra note 151 and accompanying text.
106. For reasons we explore below, however, ERISA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
such that "consequential damages are not allowed." Epstein & Sykes, supra note 30, at 632.
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not warrant restriction or abandonment of the protective rules included in
ERISA addressing the traditional pension promise. If anything, it militates
in favor of increased protection.
This is so for two reasons. First, promise complexity significantly
increases expectation uncertainty on the part of employees, which
frustrates meaningful bargaining and planning. 107 Second, promise
complexity significantly increases performance uncertainty because it
provides greater opportunity for opportunistic behavior by the promisor.108
In our view, these uncertainty perils faced by an employee who has been
promised a complicated pension are not counterbalanced by significant
collective uncertainty associated with traditional liability rules. It is
important to understand why.
Few, if any, benefit promises offer interpretative certainty. After all,
benefit promises convey an entitlement triggered upon obtaining a certain
state of the world, and entitlements contingent upon world states will
contain some degree of ambiguity as to the content of the entitlement or
the existence of the triggering world state. There will always be some
possibility-whether small or large-that two impartial arbiters will
conclude that the meaning of a benefit promise is slightly different. So let
us say that for a given benefit promise, the more likely it is that impartial
arbiters will disagree about the meaning of a benefit promise, the more
"volatile" the promise is. Comparatively high volatility can pose collective
uncertainty problems because risk-averse promisors will be less likely to
make high-volatility promises or will offer less generous promises (in
effect, charging the average promisee an "interpretative volatility
premium"). 109
Comparatively speaking, however, defined benefit pension promises
are not volatile; after all, they are necessarily formulas memorialized in
contract. 110 Indeed, to the extent a pension promise is so complicated that

107. Employees face well-recognized cognitive and transaction cost limitations. See, e.g., supra
note 22. Thus, the more complex the defined benefit promise, the more likely the employee will be
unaware of its terms.
108. Failure to honor a complex promise may never be detected (i.e., some beneficiaries may not
ultimately realize that the promisor is interpreting the promise in a less generous manner than
originally intended). Failure to honor a complex promise is also less likely to result in reputational
costs (i.e., violating the clear terms of a simple pension is considerably more likely to damage a
promisor's reputation). And failure to honor a complex promise is less likely to result in ex post legal
sanction because it may be difficult, in practice, to establish that the promise was broken.
109. In other words, a benefit promise change, occasioned by a new legal rule or otherwise, that is
expected to be X1o more costly will be avoided by promisors who have no tolerance for high variance
around an expected 1o increase. Alternatively, such promisors could severely reduce the generosity of
the promise as a hedge against cost variance.
110. In our view, the same cannot be said for non-formula-based defined benefits such as health
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it is susceptible to more than a modest range of interpretations, it bears
little resemblance to the "defined" promise ERISA intended to
subsidize." In our view, it is odd to choose legal rules prioritizing the
minimization of collective uncertainty, which is the direct result of the
underlying promise having fundamentally strayed from the central
attributes the statute intended to encourage.
Perhaps more importantly, however, promisors are well positioned to
deal with volatility privately (i.e., by making less complicated
promises).1 12 After all, ERISA explicitly requires that traditional pension
benefits are defined and disclosed in a manner comprehensible to the
"average plan participant."113 To us, this indicates a preference for rules
that are more likely to render promises simple and intelligible. It hardly
seems faithful to congressional intent, therefore, to favor rules that permit
complicated promises at the cost of heightened performance and
expectation uncertainty.
Two Wrinkles. Although far less common, defined benefit pension
disputes can arise over matters other than promise content. One important
category presents acute expectation and collective uncertainties (i.e.,
disputes over the right of a promisor to change the terms of the promise).
The importance of rule selection and interpretation in this context is
difficult to overstate: an unfettered right to modify promise content
essentially makes a pension promise illusory (and thus often "broken");
the lack of a right to modify content makes a promise permanent (and thus
rarely made). The mix of uncertainties implicated by this issue is both
complex and unique; thorough examination is beyond the scope of this
paper. 114

insurance. See infra Part III.C (exploring, at length, the nature and consequences of the health
insurance benefit).
111. See supra note 103 (discussing numerous ERISA provisions requiring specificity in the
defined benefit pension promise).
112. Perhaps the downside is that simpler promises do not accurately reflect the nuanced
preferences of the players. But that is a policy judgment. Imagine the following: Under Regime A,
pension promises are subject to traditional or employee-favoring legal rules. In such a regime, one
would expect simple and generic defined benefit pensions that closely resemble (or in fact are)
standard annuities bought and sold on the open market, with little expectation uncertainty and few
disputes. Under Regime B, pension promises are subject to promisor-favoring legal rules (e.g., damage
limitations, standards of review deferential to the promisor, and mandatory administrative review prior
to commencement of suit). One would expect complicated pensions that might better reflect the
specific preferences of many employees but which would also pose heightened expectation risk.
Which regime is "better" depends on empirics and normative judgments.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006); see also supranote 101 (discussing § 1022(a)).
114. For an excellent treatment of the economic arguments underlying the debate over this issue,
see James A. Wooten, Who Should Own a Pension Surplus-Employer or Employees? An
Assessment of Arguments about Asymmetry of Risks and Rewards and Deferred Wages in Pension
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A second major category implicates what are commonly referred to as
fiduciary duties and statuses. Fiduciary matters, and their attendant
uncertainty, can arise in any benefit arrangement; however, they pervade
the defined contribution pension promise. As such, we address them in our
discussion below. 115
B. Defined ContributionPension Promise Uncertainty
From its inception, ERISA has regulated defined contribution pension
plans. When the statute was enacted, however, such plans were a relatively
minor part of the pension landscape. Because there are some uncertainties
associated with any pension plan arrangement, Congress subjected defined
contribution arrangements to some of the rules it had designed to govern
defined benefit pension plans.1 16 The uncertainties associated with the
modern defined contribution pension arrangement, however, are markedly
different from those associated with a traditional pension plan.
Conceptualizing the Promise. To the uninitiated, the phrase "defined
contribution" arrangement may prompt the question: who is contributing
what to what? The simple answer: an employee is contributing some of
her current compensation (which conceptually includes an employer's
matching contribution) to an individual investment account.117 The simple
answer, however, does not immediately reveal what, if anything, the
promisor is agreeing to do. Logically, a defined contribution pension
arrangement is comprised of two promises. First, the employer promises to
make contributions of a certain amount to an employee's account.118
Second, the employer promises to have some involvement in connection
with the administiration or investment of that account or both. 119

Plans (May 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1141918. For a
comprehensive economic analysis of an analogous issue in the non-retirement-plan setting, see IARK
J. WARSHAWSKY, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 10 (1992) (evaluating two
policy options: "the status quo and 'ERISA-fication"').
115. See infra Part II.B-C.

116. See, e.g., supranotes 92, 93, 100, 101 and accompanying text.
117. Some arrangements couple an employee's pretax wage contribution with a employer match,
but, functionally, the total "contribution" is all employee compensation. In economic terms, the match
represents foregone wages. See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining that all benefits are wage
substitutes).
118. This is true even where there is no matching contribution; in that case, the employer is
promising to administer the transfer of the employee contribution.
119. Were neither of these the case, the arrangement would not be a bilateralbenefit promise. It
would be an individual tax-preferred savings plan self-administered by the employee who self-funded
with wages.
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The first promise-an agreement to contribute-is similar to the
formula promise in a defined benefit pension plan. Because it is extremely
simple, the promise to contribute poses little performance and expectation
uncertainty. Likewise, legal rules designed to enforce this promise are
unlikely to cause meaningful collective uncertainty. The second promiserelated to account involvement-presents a considerably different mix of
uncertainties. Broadly speaking, it implicates what we refer to as
"fiduciary" considerations. 12 0
Fiduciary relationships arise in situations where a principal wishes to
engage an agent to act on her behalf, but is unwilling or unable to engage
in sufficient monitoring of the agent's activities to ensure the agent is
faithfully serving the principal's interest.121 Frequently, an agent possesses
expertise, training, or capability that the principal lacks. This makes
reliable monitoring challenging. In lieu of direct monitoring, a fiduciary
bargain can be struck, pursuant to which the agent agrees to assume
particular duties to the principal. Alternatively, there are circumstances
where law, in the absence of a bargain, imposes fiduciary duties on parties
with a certain type of relationship. 122 In either case, it is often too costly or
difficult to specify in advance how, precisely, a fiduciary should act on the
principal's behalf. Accordingly, whether arising by agreement or by law,
fiduciary relationships are routinely defined by various standards of
conduct that have been developed to clarify a fiduciary's duties. 12 3

120. See supratext accompanying note 115 (identifying the relevance of fiduciary duties in some
defined benefit pension plan disputes).
121. We use principal and agent in the economic sense-where Party A engages Party B to act on
Party A's behalf-not the formal legal sense, where control is an element of agency.
122. To what extent such duties are subject to change by agreement is a matter of much academic
debate. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and FiduciaryDuty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 598 (1997).
The conditions that generate state-imposed fiduciary restrictions not only impel limits on the
fiduciary's power, but they impel limits on the beneficiary's power ... to consent to departure
from those restrictions. Those limits are more rigorous than the limits on the nonbeneficiary's power to consent to departure from the restrictions of "mere" contract doctrine.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH L. REV. 1 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Tamar Frankel,
FiduciaryDuties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of
Good Faith in Delaware Corporate FiduciaryLaw: A ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L.
491 (2004).
123. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, FiduciaryRelationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
303, 303 (1999) ("Fiduciary law delineates the ways in which such relationships arise and identifies
the standards of conduct to which a fiduciary must conform, including requirements of loyalty, zeal,
and self-sacrifice.").
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In virtually all defined contribution pension plans, promisees rely on
plan fiduciaries to perform functions that are too difficult or costly for
promisees to perform on their own. 124 While some fiduciary obligations,
such as the restrictions on "prohibited transactions," have been expressed
in sets of fairly clear rules, 125 the core aspects of fiduciary duties under
ERISA are expressed and applied as standards-such as the duty to act
"solely in the interest of beneficiaries" and the duty to prudently
administer the plan. 12 6 Few, if any, promisees understand with confidence
what such duties mean in a circumstance-specific way. 127 Accordingly,
these fiduciary promises are particularly susceptible to expectation
uncertainty.128
Uncertainty Implications. The expectation uncertainty that permeates
fiduciary promises may lead to collective uncertainty. Whether the

124. For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of investment self-direction, the
promisor's fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is actively deciding how to invest
assets beneficially owned by the plan participant. But even for plans that do offer self-directed
accounts (and with respect to promisees who exercise that option), residual fiduciary duties remain.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2006).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006). ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who "has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration" of a pension or welfare plan. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A)(iii) (2006). It subjects every fiduciary to a general duty of loyalty by providing that he
"shall discharge his duties . .. for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries ... and ... defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1). Similarly, it subjects every fiduciary to a general duty of care by providing that he "shall
discharge his duties . . . with the care, skill prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
127. For example, in plans where the participants do not self-direct their investments, they may
have little or no understanding of what it means for the fiduciary to be investing prudently. Even in
plans where the participants select their own investments, there may be considerable expectation
uncertainty because of the fiduciary relationship. For example, participants in such a plan may have
little or no understanding of the size and prudence of various fees the fiduciary negotiates with
essential third parties (i.e., financial intermediaries).
128. Some prominent theorists have described the fiduciary relationship as an example of a
"relational" or "incomplete" contract. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, PrinciplesofRelational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1127 (1981) (arguing that fiduciary relationships "are properly
analyzed as relational contracts because they tend to be characterized by uncertainty about factual
conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of difficulty in describing specifically the
desired adaptations to contingencies"). In our view, analysis of ERISA fiduciary law could benefit
greatly from consideration of the well-developed literature regarding incomplete contracts. See, e.g.,
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Subha Narasimhan, Of
Expectations, Incomplete Contracting,and the Bargain Principle, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1123 (1986). In
exploring the regulation of ERISA-governed health benefits, at least one notable scholar has
persuasively drawn from this literature. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care
"Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1999) (recognizing the incomplete nature of the health insurance contract and
arguing that certain benefit mandates may, therefore, be economically efficient).
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fiduciary is the promisor itself or a party working with the promisor to
administer the defined contribution plan, a legal regime designed to
protect individual promisees-by construing strictly and broadly the
fiduciary obligations-is likely to discourage players from wishing to
serve as fiduciaries, or, alternatively, cause them to charge more for doing
so. Thus, "fiduciary chill" is a legitimate concern when selecting legal
rules governing fiduciary conduct. There are, however, measures that may
efficiently mitigate "fiduciary chill." For example, it is sometimes possible
to couple strongly protective liability rules with "safe harbor" carve outs
(i.e., ex ante statutory descriptions of circumstances in which the fiduciary
obligation is eliminated or significantly limited). 129 Put simply, the
objective is to reduce the scope of conduct governed by standards by
subjecting a commonly recurring fact pattern to classic rules.130
A Wrinkle Returns. There is one fiduciary issue that, as mentioned
above, recurs across ERISA promises: misrepresentation. Whatever the
underlying promise, such disputes arise when (i) a promisee seeks advice
from the fiduciary about either the content of the benefit or the
consequences of a benefit-related action or decision, (ii) the fiduciary
provides inaccurate or incomplete advice, and (iii) the promisee relies on it
to her detriment. 13 1 The challenge is determining what legal rules should
apply in such cases. Weakly protective rules may have devastating
consequences in performance and expectation uncertainty terms.132 On the

129. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). Pursuant to this safe harbor, the fiduciary obligations
of a promisor are vastly reduced in cases where the promisee is directing her own defined contribution
plan investments. There are disputes, of course, about what residual fiduciary duties remain. But
disputes on the margins pose less collective uncertainty than would be present in the absence of a safe
harbor.
130. Whether converting the fiduciary standard to a specialized rule is desirable in any particular
circumstance is, of course, a separate question. The predictability of any rule may be outweighed by
the loss of flexibility inherent in the fiduciary standard. Moreover, one might challenge the likelihood
that government officials will select a desirable rule. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman,
Controlling the Cost of Medical Care: A Dose of Deregulation 1 (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1158547 ("We take seriously the insights of the
Hayekian tradition that decentralized market actors are better able to identify and use relevant
information than a single sclerotic government agency that is beset with administrative and political
problems of its own."). And some matters are so dependent on idiosyncratic factual specifics that a
useful standard to rule conversion would be functionally impossible. Put simply, efforts to convert
ERISA's fiduciary promise into one that relies entirely on contract principles are misguided. Cf
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879,
880 ("My thesis is that, even considering the obligation's elusive nature, descriptions drawn
exclusively from contract principles are surely mistaken.").
131. See, e.g., Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2007) (employee was
told that he was not required to be an active employee in order to receive benefits; upon his death, his
widow was denied benefits on the grounds that he was not an active employee).
132. This is true because fiduciaries may have insufficient incentive to exercise care in dispensing
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other hand, strongly protective rules may increase collective
uncertainty. 133 Arguably, these increased costs will be substantial because
misrepresentation allegations, especially if, in part, oral, may be costly to
disprove.
C. Welfare Benefit Promise Uncertainty
As noted above, ERISA was not confined to the regulation of pension
plans. The inclusion of welfare plans within the statute is often described
by scholars as an "afterthought," whose regulatory consequences were
hardly contemplated by legislators who had devoted years to examining
pension reform. 134
Self-evident is that welfare plan promises-which supply life,
disability, and, most importantly, health insurance-are of a different
character entirely than retirement promises and implicate different
uncertainties. Below, we focus on the uncertainties that attend the health
insurance promise, because nowhere are the unanticipated consequences
of ERISA's welfare plan regulation more severe. Indeed, it is no
overstatement to say that the collective uncertainty associated with
application of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions to employersponsored health insurance has fundamentally transformed the practical
effect of the statute in numerous areas. There is simply no chance that the
path of the law would have unfolded as it did if health insurance promises
had been excluded from the statute's dominion. In order to appreciate this
reality, we need to first understand the nature of health insurance in
America today. Such will illuminate how and why employer-sponsored
health insurance presents a unique and powerful mix of uncertainties.

advice. Accordingly, fiduciary conduct (or inaction) may result in promisees actively forming
mistaken expectations about the content or consequences of the benefit promise. See, e.g., Griggs v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 374-76 (4th Cir. 2001) (fiduciary told employee that
he could receive a lump sum early retirement distribution tax-deferred but failed to notify him when it
found out that a tax-deferred lump sum was not permitted under federal laws).
133. This is true for two reasons. First, exposure to civil liability (for advice that can be attacked
ex post as imperfect) may reduce the willingness of promisors to authorize their agents to discuss the
meaning of the plans with promisees. This chilling of communication may be perceived as undesirable
because, in most cases, the fiduciary will have correctly explained to the promisee a plan condition or
consequence that the promisee did not previously understand. Second, exposure to civil liability (for
advice that can be attacked ex post as imperfect) may increase the cost of plan administration. Put
simply, fiduciaries may continue to give advice but price into their services the expected cost of the
increased liability. In the case of a fiduciary-promisor, this increased cost merely takes the form of a
reduction in the generosity of the initial promise.
134. Hyman & Hall, supranote 87; see also supranote 87.
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The Health Insurance Promise. Insurance is a hedge against risk where
one agrees to incur a small certain loss (the premium) in order to protect
against a large uncertain loss (the loss-payout event). To oversimplify,
willingness to pay an insurance premium depends upon the likelihood of
the loss-payout event, the magnitude of the loss payout, and the insured's
level of risk aversion.
Consider "dice insurance." If one had to pay six dollars should a fair
die come up "6," what would one pay to insure against the loss? The
likelihood of loss is 1/6; the magnitude of the loss is minus six dollars. A
fair premium is one dollar, plus some amount corresponding to one's risk
aversion regarding a six dollar loss. Most people, relative to a six dollar
loss, are risk neutral, and thus would not be willing to pay more than a one
dollar premium. At the risk of stating the obvious, health insurance is far
more complex. In dice insurance, the calculus is straightforward: one
knows precisely how much money one needs to address the loss event, as
well as the likelihood of the loss event.
Health insurance is a considerably more difficult bet because very few
individuals know the average cost of treatment they will need should they
become ill or the likelihood of getting ill. Therefore, they will be unable to
calculate an actuarially fair premium based on their expected treatment
cost. Nor do they have any sense of the variance associated with any ex
ante estimates of either of those two inputs. So they will be unable to
determine the additional risk premium they are willing to pay. 135
Practically speaking, then, a potential insured lacks the ability to calculate
the expected cost to "fix" herself if sick or to determine how much that
expected cost will vary. Accordingly, she cannot price insurance using a
straightforward calculus.
What a potential insured can do, presumably, is estimate a "reservation
price premium" by determining the highest premium she would pay in
exchange for an insurance deal that promised to restore her health (within
the limits of modem medicine) in the event she becomes sick. In a
decently functioning market with informed insurers, a buyer armed only
with an idiosyncratic reservation price (but one that is, unknown to the

135. Assume a potential insured determines that the likelihood of getting sick in the coming year
is 20%, and the average cost of treatment is $200. An actuarially fair premium is .2 x 200, or $40. Of
course, the various illnesses one could get vary widely. As such, the cost of treatment varies
enormously. Without knowing the extent of such variance, one would have little basis upon which to
reasonably calculate the additional risk premium one was willing to pay. Cognitive biases, of course,
complicate the matter further. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1218 (2003) (discussing cognitive biases in insurance
purchasing).
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buyer, in fact reasonable) can still strike something approximating an
actuarially fair deal by initiating a result-specific reverse auction (i.e., "I
would like to buy insurance from whomever gives me the best price on the
following promise: you will give me whatever income I need to pay the
cost of medical services needed to remediate any adverse medical state").
Insurers will compete to offer the best price, based on their respective
calculations of the relevant inputs. 136 If the best seller price is lower than a
potential insured's reservation price, then an insurance deal premised on
"medical necessity" will be struck-with the insured never having made
anything other than the vaguest expected loss calculation or assessment of

his risk aversion.137
Uncertainty Implications. It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of
expectation uncertainty associated with the promise of "medically
necessary" care. To put it mildly, it dwarfs the expectation uncertainty
present in all other benefit promises. Accordingly, promisees regularly
assert claims for medical care that are denied. 13 8 And these administrative
claims frequently lead to civil litigation in which courts must then
ascertain the circumstance-specific meaning of "medical necessity."13 9
The health insurance promise is highly volatile because impartial
arbiters often disagree about several important aspects of the necessity
standard. 14 0 i addition, because a promise of medically necessary care
does not explicitly include a marginal cost limitation, there is relentless
upward cost pressure on the promise. To the extent that medically

136. Actual insurance markets are vastly more complicated; we, of course, do not claim every
potential insured is in fact conducting a reverse auction. In the ERISA context, matters are additionally
complicated because insurance selection involves the employer, whose interests are not perfectly
aligned with those of the employees. Such complications do not concern us here; we are simply
illustrating how insurance deals can be struck when it is obvious that insureds have not made ex ante
actuarial calculations that resemble dice insurance calculations.
137. Moreover, such a deal is consistent with social norms always and everywhere promoting the
supremacy of health among life's circumstances.
138. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008) (citation omitted)
(noting that approximately "1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA plans have health care claims denied
each year").
139. See JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION 544 (2d ed. 2005) ("Many
cases involving medical benefit denials concern the issue of whether a treatment is medically
necessary."); see also id. at 542 ("Medical plans typically exclude experimental and investigational
treatments. There has been a significant amount of litigation regarding treatments that insurers have
characterized as experimental and therefore not reimbursable."); William M. Sage, Managed Care's
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 599 (2003) ("explor[ing] the concept of medical necessity as it has
evolved in the judicial and administrative oversight of managed care").
140. This volatility is arguably increased because impartial arbiters may be emotionally biased in
favor of individuals seeking care.
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necessary care is held to encompass any potentially beneficial care,
irrespective of its marginal cost, 14 1 an insured-who is insulated from the
marginal cost-has strong incentive to demand it. 142 Health-care
professionals have strong incentives to recommend such goods and
services without regard for cost-adjusted utility. 14 3 And, as a result,
entrepreneurs have strong incentives to create them. The resulting process
drives up the price of health care, with corresponding upward pressure on
insurance premiums.144
Rising health-care prices unquestionably threaten the vitality of
employer-provided health insurance. Accordingly, legal rules perceived as
contributing to price inflation pose significant collective uncertainty. For
example, the volatility and cost of the health insurance promise are
increased by the availability of punitive damages or recovery for

141. A unit of medical care (e.g., a drug, surgery, or diagnostic procedure) that does five
peppercorns of good is arguably more "necessary" than one that does four peppercorns of good,
irrespective of the potentially steep cost of the fifth peppercorn.
142. As one noted economist recognized over forty years ago, total indemnity creates what is now
commonly referred to as ex post moral hazard: insureds facing a loss event will choose the "fix" most
consistent with their preferences without regard to cost. See Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics
of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 531 (1968). Instead of "moral hazard," we prefer the more
neutral term "discretionary cost pressure." See generally JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND
FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003) (arguing that some additional health care purchased because of
income transfers when ill is, in fact, worth more to the consumer than it costs to produce and therefore
a welfare gain).
143. Insofar as the extent of a triggering loss and possible fixes are not readily ascertainable, an
expert (i.e., physician) will need to be engaged in connection with performance of the indemnity. The
expert, as an agent, may have interests divergent from both the insurer and the insured, and thus
presents the possibility that he will act in ways injurious to one or both. How the expert is incentivized
and monitored, of course, matters with regard to the ways in which self-interested behavior will
materialize; expert engagement arrangements can be structured to be more likely to favor the insured
or the insurer. For example, a common critique of the fee-for-service model dominant in health care
until recently was that physicians routinely charged for unnecessary services to enrich themselves and
to please cost-indifferent patients. A common critique of the capitation model dominant in HMO
health care-where physicians are paid a flat fee to provide a predetermined type of care-is that
doctors underprovide care (i.e., "stint") once the capitation fee is consumed. See, e.g., Randall P. Ellis
& Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Payment Systems for Health Services, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 375 (1990)
(advancing, inter alia, an important theory of stinting); Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire,
ProviderBehavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing and Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON.
129 (1986) (same).
144. Health-economics literature abounds with proposals to control costs. In recent years, the most
common method of cost control has probably been explicit cost-sharing mechanisms such as
deductibles and coinsurance. Of course, these mechanisms have clear limitations. For example, any
such measure must be capped or it is insufficiently attractive to rational risk-averse players.
Accordingly, for demands above the cap, explicit cost sharing will not constrain the selection of more
costly fixes by an insured. Perhaps more importantly, cost sharing worries many observers because of
the specific types of foregone consumption that it has been proven to induce. See, e.g., JOSEPH P.
NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 79-103 (2002).
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emotional distress caused by wrongful coverage decisions. 145 Therefore,
limiting remedies will reduce the cost of making the health insurance
promise. So, too, would adoption of judicial review standards that favor
coverage judgments made by the promisor or its agent. The selection of
legal rules in this area requires a delicate balancing of many important
considerations. 146 A studied (and ideally legislative) assessment of whether
the collective uncertainty associated with any given legal rule (e.g.,
limiting civil remedies) is outweighed by concerns regarding competing
uncertainties is necessary. 47
IV. UNCERTAINTY IN THE SUPREME COURT

Much legal scholarship has addressed the manner in which ERISA
should be interpreted by the federal judiciary. 14 8 And no object of judicial
interpretation has generated more interest among scholars than the
complex private right of action created by the statute.149 In this Part, we

145. There are volatility concerns even in the context of "physical" consequential injuries (i.e., a
worsened physical condition). The likelihood of such consequences varies widely and is
extraordinarily difficult to predict. Cf McCahill v. N.Y. Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911) (man
dies from delirium tremens while hospitalized from car accident). Moreover, it is often difficult to
assess whether the consequential injury was partially, or entirely, the result of something other than the
benefit denial or delay. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving PreexistingConditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
146. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact on
Employer Coverage?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (1999) (noting that the rules in this context may effect
"coverage decision making, information exchange, risk contracting, and the extent of employers'
involvement in health coverage").
147. For example, it is likely that the limitation of remedies available to victims of wrongful
benefit denial or delay will significantly increase performance uncertainty. See Stris, supra note 30, at
396-97 (outlining the argument). Promisors who are not exposed to any consequential damages for
wrongful denial are considerably more likely to engage in opportunistic or careless behavior. See, e.g.,
id. at 398 n.56 (noting resolution of a recent controversy where the largest disability insurer in the
United States agreed to reexamine more than 200,000 disability claims that it had denied). While we
believe that the case for consequential damages in this context is strong, our even stronger belief is
this: prohibiting traditional consequential damages as a cost-control measure is like using a bucket to
bail out the Titanic. Arresting the rising cost of health care requires sweeping changes in how health
care is delivered, administered, and financed. Selecting remedial legal rules to govern the promise of
employer-sponsored health insurance is merely one small part of that larger discussion.
148. See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 37, at 1107 (arguing that "the mess in ERISA
fiduciary law cannot be ameliorated until courts ... recognize the multiplicity of interests that inhere
in the modem pension and employee benefit trust"); Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudenceof
Managed Care, and How to Fix It: ReinterpretingERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REv. 457, 460
(2003) (arguing that "the Supreme Court, in interpreting ERISA, rather than Congress in drafting it,
... is most responsible for the current confused and illogical state of managed care law"); Dana M.
Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 201, 242 (1995)
(arguing "that the protections of section 510 [of ERISA] should extend to plant closing situations").
149. See infra notes 154, 155.
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employ our theory of uncertainty to explain the allure and persistence of
the Court's maligned doctrinal approach to private civil enforcement. We
argue that, when given the opportunity, the Court has exploited textual
ambiguity to give voice to a profound fear of collective uncertainty. It has
done so by admittedly developing several restrictive "judicial glosses." 150
A. Civil Enforcement
The particulars of civil enforcement under ERISA defy concise
summary, but the essential provisions can be described generally as
follows: A "benefits" provision creates a private right of action through
which a participant in any pension or welfare plan may seek benefits due
under the plan."' A "fiduciary" provision creates a private right of action
through which a participant in any pension or welfare plan may police the
conduct of those who administer her plan. 152 Finally, a "catchall"
provision creates a private right of action though which various
stakeholders may seek to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief."153
Because of their extraordinary practical importance, these provisions
have regularly captured the attention of the United States Supreme Court.

150. At one oral argument, Chief Justice John Roberts candidly remarked: "you're right that we
judicially have developed a number of glosses on [ERISA], including I think most importantly the
Firestonedeference principle. But if you're right [in your current interpretation], then all of that work
has been in vain." Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128
S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (No. 06-856), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/
argument transcripts/06-856.pdf (responding to Professor Stris's claim that the plain meaning of an
ERISA provision should not be trumped by a "judicial gloss" on the statute). These judicial glosses,
wholly apart from their effect on the regulatory system, provide an important vehicle for assessing the
relationship between Congress and the federal courts. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme
Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 343, 346-51 (2002) (discussing Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The
Rehnquist Judiciary,Congress,and FederalPower, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 256-58 (2003) (same).
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing a participant in an ERISA plan to file a
civil action to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan"); see also
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (authorizing a civil action to recover "appropriate relief'); 29
U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (defining appropriate relief for purposes of § 1132(a)(2) to include restoration
by a fiduciary of "any losses to the plan resulting from [fiduciary breach]"); see also LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134 (1985); supra note 126 (discussing ERISA's definition of fiduciary and codification of broad
duties of loyalty and prudence).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (authorizing a civil action to recover "appropriate equitable relief'
to redress violations of the statute or the terms of the ERISA plan at issue); see, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid
Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); cf Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489
(1996).
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For nearly two decades, scholars have sharply criticized the Court for its
jurisprudence in this area. The most prominent critic has been Yale Law
School Professor John H. Langbein. 15 4 But he is hardly alone."' In the
sections that follow, we apply our theory to several of these important
Supreme Court decisions.
B. Limiting Remedies
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell.15 6 At issue was the plight of Doris Russell, a
Massachusetts Mutual employee suffering from a back ailment. Ms.
Russell initially received disability insurance payments for her condition
from an ERISA-governed welfare plan.15 ' After several months, however,
these benefits were terminated based on the report of an examining
physician. Ms. Russell pursued internal review of the denial; several
months later, she was able to persuade the plan to reinstate her benefits

154. For example, in 1991, Professor Langbein wrote that a decision penned by Justice O'Connor
was "such a crude piece of work that one may well question whether it had the full attention of the

Court." Langbein, supra note 43, at 228 (criticizing the Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)). He went so far as to question the Court's commitment to
competent adjudication of ERISA cases. He wrote:
I do not believe that either Justice O'Connor or her colleagues who joined this unanimous
opinion would have uttered such doctrinal hash if they had been seriously engaged in the
enterprise.
... If the Court is bored with the detail of supervising complex bodies of statutory law,
thought should be given to having that job done by a court that would take it seriously.
Langbein, supra note 43, at 228-29 (footnote omitted); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means By "Equitable":The Supreme Court'sTrail ofError in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1365 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Trail of Error] (arguing that "[tihe
Supreme Court needs to confess its error in ERISA remedy law, much as it has recently confronted its
mishandling of ERISA preemption").
155. On the issue of limited remedies, see, for example, Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of
Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 667-68 (1994); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual
DamagesMandatedfor Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 611, 665 (1994); Maher, supra note
49, at 679-81; Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA
FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 461 (2000) [hereinafter Muir, Perversity of ERISA];
Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577, 1612-14 (2002);
David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg's FirstDecade: Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the
Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 23 (2004). On the issue of judicial
review, see generally Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No Further Inquiry Into Conflicted
Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 637 (2005); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Rethinking Firestone in Light of Great-West-Implicationsfor Standard of Review and the Right to a
Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 629 (2004); Kathyrn J. Kennedy,
JudicialStandardofReview in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1083 (2001).
156. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
157. Id. at 136.
158. Id.
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and make retroactive payments for the period during which they had been
improperly withheld. 15 9 Nonetheless, Ms. Russell filed a civil lawsuit. 160
She sought consequential damages for the financial distress and
aggravation of her medical condition that she alleged arose from the
several-month period during which benefits were improperly withheld. 16 1
Her lawsuit relied exclusively on ERISA's "fiduciary" provision, which,
as noted above, permits recovery for fiduciary breach in connection with
-162
plan operation.
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that Ms.
Russell could not use the fiduciary provision to obtain consequential
damages for her temporary benefit denial. 163 This was not surprising
because her interpretation of that provision found little support in the plain
text or legislative history of the statute. As the Court noted, its purpose
was to impose personal liability on an administrator for "losses to the

plan."164
Russell should have been a straightforward decision with limited
significance because Ms. Russell relied solely on the "fiduciary"
provision. In dicta that was subsequently and colorfully described by
Professor Langbein as the beginning of a "Trail of Error,"1 6 5 however,
Justice Stevens broadly asserted that ERISA "says nothing about the
recovery of extracontractual damages" in connection with benefit denial or
delay.166 Because Ms. Russell disclaimed use of the "catchall" provision,
the Court expressly reserved judgment on whether consequential damages
would be recoverable under that provision of the statute. 167 Nonetheless,
Russell was widely read as meaning that, absent some loss to the plan,
consequential damages in connection with benefit delay or denial are not

159. Id.
160. Id. at 137.
161. Id. at 137-38.
162. See supra note 152 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006)). Ms. Russell had also asserted
state-law claims, but they were held preempted. Russell, 473 U.S. at 137.
163. Id. at 138.
164. Id. at 140 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006)). According to Justice
Stevens, a "contextual reading of the statute" confirmed that the fiduciary provision was "primarily
concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets ... rather than with the rights of an individual
beneficiary." Russell, 473 U.S. at 142.
165. Langbein, Trail ofError,supranote 154.
166. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144.
167. Id. at 139 n.5 ("Because respondent relies entirely on [the fiduciary provision], and expressly
disclaims reliance on [the catchall provision], we have no occasion to consider whether any other
provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extracontractual damages.").
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available to a promisee; all that is recoverable is the value of the promised
benefits.16 8
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,169 the Court addressed the issue that it
expressly left open in Russell. Mertens involved a claim against third-party
actuaries (Hewitt) of the Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser) pension plan.
The plaintiffs, retired employees of Kaiser, alleged that Hewitt had failed
to modify its actuarial adjustments in connection with Kaiser plant
shutdowns, leaving the plan with insufficient funds to meet the demands
of Kaiser retirees.17 0 They sued Hewitt, inter alia, under the "catchall
provision."17 1
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court's five-to-four majority, produced
an opinion that remains surprising. Resurrecting the ancient law and equity
distinction, Justice Scalia concluded that the catchall provision's reference
to "appropriate equitable relief' solely authorized "relief . . . typically

available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages)."172 In contrast, Mertens and the United States (as
amicus curiae) had urged that "appropriate equitable relief' simply meant
"whatever relief a court of equity [was] employed to provide in the
particular case at issue" 173-with there being no dispute that premerger
courts of equity had affirmative power to and often did award
compensatory damages in connection with breaches of trust. 174 Indeed,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that "equitable relief' could "assuredly
mean" precisely what Mertens and the United States proposed. 175
Nonetheless, he concluded that "in the context of the present statute,"

168. Although dicta, the lower courts interpreted the broad language in Russell to mean that
consequential damages are not available in actions brought to recover benefits due under the plan. See
Flint,supra note 155, at 621 (noting that, as a result of dicta in Russell, "many subsequent courts have
concluded, without examining the legislative history, that ERISA forecloses traditional contractual

remedies permitting recovery of extracontractual damages in the benefits-due lawsuit"); see also supra
note 151 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006)). Today, the issue appears settled. See Muir,
PerversityofERISA, supra note 155, at 436 ("Without exception, the benefits enforcement section has
been construed to permit only the recovery of benefits due under a plan.").
169. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
170. Id. at 250.
171. Id. The catchall provision does not specify who may be sued. In Mertens, the parties did not
dispute that the cause of action could be asserted against Hewitt; rather, the dispute was exclusively
over what relief was available. Id. at 251. The Court expressed some skepticism as to whether the
catchall provision could properly be used to sue a party in Hewitt's position but nonetheless "decide[d]
th[e] case on the narrow battlefield the parties have chosen, and reserve[d] decision [on the] antecedent
question." Id. at 254-55.
172. Id. at 256.
173. Id.
174. Id.
17 5. Id.
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Congress intended to limit relief to such as was "typically" available in
equity. 176
Standing together, Russell and Mertens severely limited, if not erased,
the right of an ERISA beneficiary to recover consequential damages in
connection with benefit denials or fiduciary breaches.177 While both
decisions engage in extensive consideration of ERISA's statutory text,
there is no serious disagreement that, at best, the Court's holdings in both
cases are plausible, rather than decisive, readings of ambiguous
language.178 On doctrinal grounds, scholarly disapproval of the Court's
decisions is widespread. 17 9 As Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly noted, it
strains credulity to conclude that the ninety-third Congress aimed to
provide a limited remedy reliant on a working knowledge of fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century precedent. 18 0
In our view, both opinions are more fully understood as the work of a
Court troubled by the collective uncertainty associated with the legal rules
they rejected.181 Consider Russell: a right to recover consequential

176. Id. The Court affirmed its historical approach in Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547
U.S. 356 (2006), and Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). In both
cases, the issue was what particular conditions equity imposed on an insurer's recovery of tort
proceeds from an insured. For a comprehensive discussion of tort subrogation, see Brendan S. Maher
& Radha A. Pathak, Understandingand Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U.
CI. L.J. 49, 79-82 (2008).
177. One exception is that ifa fiduciary breach causes a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary,
the plan may seek restoration of losses or disgorgement of gains. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (construing the "fiduciary" remedy); see also Linda Greenhouse,
Top Court Allows Suit Over 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at Cl ("With 70 million people
holding about $3 trillion in 401(k) investments, the 9-to-0 decision [in LaRue] was one of the most
important rulings in years on the meaning of the federal pension law . . . ."). In addition, the scope of
the catchall provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court-that is, what manner of relief was
"typically" available in equity-is still unresolved. Equitable remedies such as "surcharge" may, in
certain narrow circumstances, function as a compensatory damage analogue. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) ("If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with ...
any loss or depredation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust.").
178. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting) ("The majority candidly acknowledges
that it is plausible to interpret the phrase 'appropriate equitable relief as used in [the catchall
provision] ... as meaning that relief which was available in the courts of equity for a breach of
trust."); see also Maher, supra note 49, at 672 (discussing textual construction of the "benefits"
provision).
179. See supra notes 154, 155 and accompanying text.
180. In a recent oral argument, Justice Ginsburg pointedly asked: "Do you really think that
Congress had in mind the distinction that you are now drawing in the ring case based on 15th and 16th
century English precedent?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc.,
547 U.S. 356 (2005) (No. 05-260), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/
argument transcripts/05-206.pdf (questioning Professor Stris regarding his answer to a hypothetical
posed by Justice Breyer).
181. In Mertens, Justice Scalia rather weakly defended the majority's construction of the catchall
provision as "not nonsensical," and explained that the rule urged by Mertens would "impose high
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damages in connection with welfare benefit denial or delay implicates
massive collective uncertainty. The underlying benefit promise is
undeniably volatile and, particularly in the health-care context, trends
relentlessly upward in terms of cost. 182 If, in the event of an improper
denial, a promisor (or an affiliated fiduciary) were subject to consequential
damages, the average payout and outcome volatility associated with an
insurance promise could increase considerably. Eliminating recovery for
consequential damages addresses that concern.183
ConsiderMertens: at issue in that case was the relief available for what
was functionally a fiduciary breach in connection with plan
administration. 184 Fiduciary conduct rules, as we have explained, can be
volatile and pose significant collective uncertainty, particularly so in
certain circumstances. If the damages for such conduct are limited to
Mertens-bounded "equitable" relief (such as restitution, i.e., the return of
an ill-gotten discrete amount, or injunctive relief, as opposed to traditional
"legal" consequential damages), the costs of breach are constrained and
collective uncertainty concerns assuaged.
The downside, however, is that the Court's limitation of the catchall
provision also results in heightened performance uncertainty. Such may
not be immediately obvious because the fiduciary provision authorizes
monetary damages if breach results in a loss to the plan or ill-gotten profits
to the fiduciary.18 But there is a setting in which the Mertens limitation

insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence
upon ERISA plans themselves." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262. In Russell, Justice Stevens described the
Court's holding as consonant with Congress's concern that "the cost of federal standards [would]
discourage the growth of private pension plans." Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
148 n.17 (1985).
182. See supra Part III.B-C. Russell was a disability (not health) insurance case. But it strains
credulity to believe that the Court, in deciding Russell, was not imagining a world filled with plaintiffs
seeking consequential damages in health care disputes. And health insurance is more volatile than
disability insurance because disability insurance has a determinate contractual payout. Health
insurance does not. Moreover, the consequential damages for health coverage denials, for obvious
reasons, present even greater collective uncertainty than they would in the disability insurance setting.
183. As noted above, the elimination of consequential damages will likely heighten performance
uncertainty; the temptation to engage in strategic or careless denials is stronger when the only risk is
the modest possibility of a promisee recovering attorneys' fees. Even scholars who believe
reputational concerns do much to police enforcement acknowledge the danger of eliminating such
damages in the context of health insurance. See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 30, at 643 (noting
that the arguments in favor of consequential damages have "considerable force and may in the end be
convincing").
184. That Hewitt was not a fiduciary, Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, is immaterial. At issue was the
relief available regarding a claim asserted to be actionable because it fell short of a fiduciary-like
standard of care.
185. In many cases, then, fiduciary conduct will be appropriately policed, to the extent that the
breach satisfies one ofthe fiduciary provision's two conditions.
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results in enormous performance uncertainty: misrepresentations. When a
fiduciary renders inaccurate advice to a promisee who thereafter relies on
the advice to her detriment, there often is no loss to the plan and no gain
by the fiduciary. In such cases, the fiduciary provision simply will not
apply. And if, as is often the case, the fiduciary misrepresentation did not
deny the promisee any benefits to which she was contractually entitled, the
benefits provision will provide no remedy. In these settings, a fiduciary
may be able to supply careless advice with no consequence. 186 This result
has, understandably, troubled observers.187
C. Limiting Review
The second important judicial gloss upon ERISA's private right of
action concerns the standard of review in benefit disputes. In Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,188 the Court considered the appropriate
standard of review in an action over an allegedly improper denial of
severance benefits in connection with a corporate sale. 1 89 Firestone urged
deferential review (i.e., adoption of the rule that a reviewing court may
overturn a plan administrator's benefit denial only if it was "arbitrary and
capricious"). 190
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court rejected
Firestone's argument and held that the proper standard of review for
benefit decisions was de novo. 191 Nonetheless, in a regrettable and
unnecessary detour, the Court declared that deferential review would be
required where the plan "gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of
the plan."l 92 The only limit the Firestone Court announced on deferential
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary's actual
conflict of interest as "a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse
of discretion."' 1 93 In other words: plans could simply write discretionary

186. See supra note 131 (discussing Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342 (5th Cir.
2007)).
187. See, e.g., Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2007) (Benavides,
J., concurring) (noting that the facts of the case "scream out for a remedy," but ERISA does not permit
relief).
188. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
189. 489 U.S. at 105-06. Firestone was limited to the appropriate standard of review in suits
premised on the "benefits" remedial provision. The Court "express[ed] no view as to the appropriate
standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA." Id. at 108.
190. Id. at 111-12.
191. Id. at 115.
192. Id. The detour was unnecessary because the Firestone plan lacked a discretionary provision.
193. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
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authority-and thus deferential review-into the plan document, and even
in the presence of a conflict of interest, courts must use an abuse-ofdiscretion review, modified in some unspecified way by the presence of
the conflict. Plan provisions awarding discretion to administrators
immediately became de riguer. For two decades thereafter, the lower
courts have struggled to identify in benefits disputes when a conflict of
interest exists and how such a conflict should be weighed as a "factor" in
conducting an abuse-of-discretion review.194
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,195 the Court recently
addressed both issues. Glenn arose from a denial of disability benefits,
where an insurer, MetLife (on behalf of employer Sears Roebuck),
administered and paid benefits. 19 6 As an initial matter, the Court
determined that a fiduciary who both administered the plan and paid
benefits suffered from a conflict of interest. 19 7 Nonetheless, the Court
declined to disturb Firestone, affirming that, even where a conflict of
interest is present, the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. 198
The Court attempted to add substance to the "factor" analysis of Firestone
by explaining that "circumstances" should inform a reviewing court in
weighing the presence of the conflict; it refused, however, to offer
"'talismanic words that can avoid the process ofjudgment."' 99
Because virtually all plans include discretionary provisions, Firestone
and Glenn supply a de facto deferential standard of review in all lawsuits
challenging benefit determinations. Such might be a sensible rule were
benefit determinations customarily made by impartial arbiters. Yet the
opposite is true under ERISA. Because the statute does not prohibit plan
sponsors from directly or indirectly controlling those charged with
administering the plan, conflicted fiduciaries are commonplace.2 00
That a statute intended to protect promisees would subject the decisions
of conflicted administrators to weak judicial review is hard to believe.201

194. See Bogan & Fu, supra note 155, at 652 n.71 (discussing standards of "conflict" review
across circuits).
195. 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).
196. Id. at 2346-47.
197. Id. at 2348 (holding that there is a conflict where "a plan administrator both evaluates claims
for benefits and pays benefits claims"). MetLife had argued that no conflict existed.
198. Id. at 2350.
199. Id. at 2352 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951)).
200. See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 15, at 2297; see also John H. Langbein, Trust Law as
Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and JudicialReview ofBenefit Denials Under ERISA,
101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1325 (2007) ("[Most ERISA plan benefit denials are the work of
decisionmakers operating under serious conflicts of interest.").
201. Employees face many obstacles that limit their ability to bargain fairly. See, e.g., Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Labor
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But deferential review has the obvious appeal of minimizing collective
uncertainty. Plan sponsors have assurances that their benefit promises will
be construed in a manner favorable to them, and challenges to benefit
determinations may decline as a result of a promisee facing an uphill legal
battle.202 For those disputes that do proceed to litigation, promise volatility
associated with judicial construction is largely avoided because courts will
defer absent an abuse of discretion. 20 3 Employers are, all things being
equal, more likely to offer plans and generous benefits when their
promises are subjected only to deferential review. Of course, deferential
review also leads to acute performance uncertainty by encouraging selfserving benefit determinations that fall short of being arbitrary and
capricious. And it incentivizes promise complexity-and thus heightens
expectation uncertainty.204 Where a promisor's construction of a complex
promise must be accepted by the courts unless it is arbitrary, one would
expect increasingly complicated promises.
CONCLUSION

ERISA is a statutory conglomerate.205 It regulates benefit promises so
different in character that they resemble one another only insofar as they
share a common nexus to employment. In modem America, these benefit
promises have enormous social significance: they govern over $5 trillion

and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 688-95 (1993) (discussing employee bargaining problems).
This, indeed, is in part why ERISA was enacted in the first place. Were employees capable of
negotiating the best deal for themselves, many of ERISA's protections would be unnecessary.
202. Cf Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical
Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1068 (1996) (noting that
patients often "find it too expensive or too difficult to pursue their objections through the costly and
time-consuming judicial process").
203. The Court recently held that even after an administrator acts arbitrarily and capriciously, the
administrator does not automatically lose deference by the reviewing court if the administrators had
simply made an "honest mistake." See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010). Among
the rationales the Court cited for its decision were efficiency, predictability, and uniformity. Id. at
1649-51.
204. See supra Part LB-C.
205. Coincidentally, its drafting and passage overlapped with a different type of conglomerate.
See, e.g., Harvey H. Segal, The Urge to Merge: The Time of the Conglomerates,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1968, at SM32. In the late '60s and early '70s, corporate "conglomerates"-entities with disparate
businesses in largely unconnected market sectors-enjoyed their modem heyday. See CHARLES R.
SPRUILL, CONGLOMERATES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 1 (1982) (defining conglomerates as

"firms which face numerous distinct markets, each with its own supply, demand, and profit
characteristics"); see also Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 26 (2008) (explaining that in the '70s, "conglomerates became a familiar part of the fabric
of U.S. business"). They did not fare well throughout the '70s or thereafter. Although some have
survived, "conglomerates remain largely discredited." Id. at 27.
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in retirement funds; 206 they set forth the terms by which more than 100
million citizens receive health care; 20 7 and they receive approximately
$250 billion in annual tax subsidization. 2 08 The legal rules that govern
such promises are necessarily of fundamental importance.
Throughout this Article, we have used uncertainty analysis to challenge
the notion that ERISA-as currently written, interpreted, and applied-is
supplying optimal benefit promise rules. The characteristics and likely
disputes that attend different benefit promises vary widely. As such, any
thoughtful selection of legal rules must entail identification, weighing, and
balancing of context-specific uncertainties. For reasons we have
illustrated, this task is beyond the capability and-as retired Justice David
Souter made clear-interest of the judiciary.2 09
ERISA must be fundamentally reexamined. It was originally passed
after almost ten years of study involving the paradigmatic benefit promise
of 1974-the traditional pension. 2 10 The statute has been quite successful
in meeting its original goals. But the benefit promise has dramatically
changed in thirty-five years. Consequently, thorough examination of the
relevant uncertainties in the new benefit promise has never been
systematically undertaken. Until such examination occurs, continued
reliance on private promises will unsatisfactorily protect the health and
retirement security of the American public.

206. See supra note 3.
207. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 2, 61 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Justice Souter to Retire From Court, WALL ST. J., May
1, 2009, at Al ("Justice Souter has complained about life in Washington and even about aspects of the
court's work, such as the numbingly technical cases involving applications of pension or benefits
law.").
210. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (explaining that
ERISA was enacted after "almost a decade of studying the Nation's private pension plans").

